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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Whether the evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the defendants and most supportive of the 
district court's findings and conclusions that plaintiff failed 
to establish fraud by clear and convincing evidence, so clearly 
preponderates against the district court's findings so as to 
require reversal of the district court's judgment. 
II. Whether the district court erred or abused its 
discretion in admitting into evidence the deposition testimony 
of witness Robert H. Posey so as to require reversal of the 
district court's judgment of no cause of action. 
III. Whether the district court failed to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with the 
evidence, arguments, issues, and theories presented to it, so 
as to require reversal of the district court's judgment. 
IV. Whether breach of contract and unjust enrichment 
issues raised for the first time on this appeal are reviewable 
and require reversal of the district court's judgment of no 
cause of action. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 804(a)(5), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) 
("U.R.E."), states: 
"Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant . . . (5) is 
absent from the hearing and the proponent of his 
statement has been unable to procure his 
attendance by process or other reasonable means. 
Rule 804(b)(1), U.R.E., states: 
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The following [is] not excluded by the 
hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a 
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in 
compliance with law in the course of the same or 
another proceeding, if the party against whom the 
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action 
or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an 
opportunity and similar motive to develop the 
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect 
examination. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
On October 25, 1979, plaintiff instituted this action 
against defendants, alleging that defendants had knowingly 
defrauded plaintiff in connection with the sale of a certain 
1979 Buick Regal. Plaintiff sought damages and rescission of 
the sales contract. (Record ("R.") at 1-3, 80-85). 
II. Course of Proceeding and Disposition in the 
District Court 
On May 13, 1985, this case was tried without a jury 
before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock. (R. at 122-23). On 
July 5, 1985, Judge Bullock, having heard the evidence and 
taken the matter under advisement, and having been fully 
advised, ruled in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff 
on plaintiff's claims. (R. at 124). Subsequently, on August 
13, 1985, Judge Bullock ordered, adjudged, and decreed that 
plaintiff's complaint was dismissed for no cause of action as 
to all defendants. (R. at 130). 
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III. Statement of Facts 
On or about September 12, 1979, plaintiff, Harlen W. 
Brown, purchased a certain 1979 Buick Regal vehicle from 
defendants. Plaintiff traded in his 1978 Chevrolet vehicle as 
a down payment and received a credit therefor. The balance of 
the purchase price was financed over a period of 48 months. 
(R. at 128, Findings 6-8). In connection with the purchase, 
plaintiff signed a Vehicle Buyer's Order (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
("Ex.") 2) on which the Buick Regal's outgoing odometer reading 
of 11,946 miles was recorded. (R. at 128, Finding 9; 
Transcript ("Tr.") at 57). Plaintiff also signed an Invoice 
and Order (Defendants' Ex. 4) on which was placed the notation 
"DT", referring to the fact that the Buick Regal was a 
demonstrator or driver's training car. (Tr. at 33, 50). 
Although the Buick Regal was in a sense "new" in that 
it had not been sold previously, it was a demonstrator or 
driver's training vehicle, as mentioned above, and thus had 
mileage on it. (Tr. at 65-66). Defendants had no intention of 
deceiving plaintiff as to the nature or character of the 
vehicle. Indeed, defendants specifically told plaintiff that 
the Buick Regal was a demonstrator or driver's training car and 
also refrained from using the word "new" in their discussions 
with plaintiff. (Tr. at 42, 47-49, 65-66, 68). Further, 
plaintiff was given several opportunities to inspect the Buick 
Regal and to read each document that he signed. Relevant 
information concerning the nature or character of the vehicle 
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was easily accessible to plaintiff; defendants did not conceal 
or attempt to conceal any facts. In connection therewith, 
defendants explained the information contained in the documents 
to plaintiff (Tr. at 53); and plaintiff test drove the Buick 
Regal before finalizing the purchase (Tr. at 47, 54, 66). 
The day after the sale, plaintiff returned to 
defendants' dealership so that certain features, as had been 
agreed, could be added to the vehicle or so that a time could 
be arranged therefor. (Tr. at 59-60). At that time plaintiff 
expressed some concern or surprise with respect to the number 
of miles on the Buick Regal. (Tr. at 59-60). Plaintiff then 
requested that certain work be done on the vehicle. In an 
effort to satisfy plaintiff, defendants were willing to perform 
the requested work so that plaintiff's concerns could be taken 
care of. (Tr. at 59-60). Plaintiff returned to the dealership 
several times (at least ten), each time requesting work to be 
done on the vehicle. (Tr. at 29-30). Defendants cooperated 
each time by performing the work. (Tr. at 30, 62-64). 
Plaintiff admitted that he continued to be interested in 
keeping the vehicle until after his several visits to 
defendants' service department. (Tr. at 30, 60-63). 
Subsequently--about a month after plaintiff purchased 
the Buick Regal--plaintiff expressed dissatisfaction with the 
vehicle, stating to defendants that he no longer wanted to keep 
it. Plaintiff refused to pay any part of the amount due and 
owing to defendants and thus defaulted under the terms of the 
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Conditional Sales Contract (Plaintiff's Ex. 1). (Tr. at 
20-21). Approximately four to six months after plaintiff's 
purchase, defendants repossessed the Buick Regal in accordance 
with their rights under the Conditional Sales Contract and the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-9-501 to 
-505 ("U.C.C."). (Tr. at 20-22). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court's judgment should be affirmed for 
the following reasons: 
First, the evidence in the record, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to defendants, supports the district 
court's finding that plaintiff failed to establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that defendants defrauded plaintiff in 
connection with the sale of k certain 1979 Buick Regal. 
Secondly, the district court did not err or abuse its 
discretion in admitting certain deposition testimony into 
evidence. The district court, in its discretion, determined 
that the witness was unavailable for purposes of Rule 
804(a)(5), U.R.E., and that the requirements of the former 
testimony exception of Rule 804(b)(1), U.R.E., were satisfied. 
Thirdly, the district court did not fail to make findings and 
conclusions in accordance with the issues raised and the 
evidence and theories presented to it. Plaintiff brought this 
action, claiming fraud and seeking damages and rescission of a 
contract. Accordingly, the district court made findings and 
conclusions with respect to plaintiff's claims, denying 
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relief. Although plaintiff claims that the district court 
failed to make findings on breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment claims, plaintiff did not allege those claims in his 
pleadings and did not even raise such issues at trial. 
Plaintiff cannot assert for the first time on this appeal 
allegations (which defendants contend are not even supported by 
the evidence) that defendants breached their contract with 
plaintiff or that defendants were unjustly enriched. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
FRAUD BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff brought this action, seeking damages and 
rescission of a contract on the basis of fraud. The burden of 
proof is one of clear and convincing evidence. See Horton v. 
Horton, 695 P..2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984); Cheever v. Schramm, 
577 P.2d 951 (Utah 1978). One claiming fraud must establish 
the following essential elements: (1) a false representation 
concerning a presently existing material fact, (2) made 
knowingly or recklessly without sufficient knowledge, (3) for 
the purpose of inducing the other party to rely thereon, (4) 
upon which there is reasonable, justifiable reliance, (5) to 
that party's detriment. Horton, 695 P.2d 102; Taylor v. 
Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980); Blodgett v. Martsch, 
590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
The district court determined that plaintiff failed to 
meet his burden of establishing, by clear and convincing 
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evidence, that defendants had defrauded plaintiff in connection 
with the sale of a certain 1979 Buick Regal. (R. at 128, 
Findings 12-14). The district court therefore dismissed 
plaintiff's complaint for no cause of action. (R. at 129, 
Conclusion 2). As set forth herein, there was sufficient 
credible evidence to sustain the district court's findings and 
conclusions. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 6454 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982) (if evidence in record 
supports trial court's conclusion, such will not be disturbed 
by Supreme Court); Tibbitts v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d 442, 425 
P.2d 160, 161-62 (1967). 
The defendants having prevailed below, the evidence 
and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom must 
be reviewed in the light most favorable to the defendants. 
See Horton, 695 P.2d at 106; Cheever, 577 P.2d 951; Pace v. 
Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah 1952). In this regard, the 
present case is somewhat similar to that of Thomas v. 
Caldwell, 27 Utah 2d 423, 497 P.2d 31 (1972), wherein the 
plaintiff brought an action against the buyers of her antique 
vases to recover possession of the vases and to rescind the 
sale. This Court stated: "The trial court was of the 
In Thomas the plaintiff contended that the buyers 
held themselves out as expert appraisers and induced plaintiff 
to rely upon their expert knowledge as to the value of the 
vases. The trial court found no fiduciary relationship 
between the buyers and seller even though the seller, who 
claimed she was defrauded, had trusted the buyers since they 
had been long-time friends of the seller's children. In the 
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opinion that . . . the evidence fails to show misrepresenta-
tions on the part of the defendants. We are obliged to review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the findings of the 
court below and to sustain its judgment if possible. . . . 
[P]laintiff has failed to sustain her claim of fraud by clear 
and convincing evidence." Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
The standard of appellate review is that of clear 
preponderance. This Court will not upset or disturb the 
findings in the trial court unless the evidence, when viewed in 
a light most supportive of the trial court's findings, so 
clearly preponderates against the findings that this Court is 
convinced that manifest injustice has been done. See Horton, 
695 P.2d at 105; In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 
1982) (review of equity case); Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) (reviewing Court 
(n.1 continued) 
present case, involving a typical arm's-length sales 
transaction, there is an even stronger showing that no 
fiduciary or confidential relationship arose between the 
plaintiff, as buyer, and the defendants, as sellers. Moreover, 
"under Utah law, the general rule is [that] no fiduciary 
obligations exist between a buyer and seller of any property." 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Utah 1980). There are 
only a few relationships (such as parent-child, 
attorney-client, trustee-cestui) that the law deems to be 
confidential. See Blodgett, 590 P.2d at 302. Plaintiff 
failed to establish such a relationship. 
Even assuming that plaintiff had proven that a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship arose between him and 
the defendants, it is defendants' contention that even under 
the lesser burden of proof, plaintiff failed to prove fraud in 
connection with the sale of the Buick Regal. 
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indulges in presumption of verity to the findings of trier of 
fact and will not disturb such findings unless it appears that 
there is substantial prejudicial error or that the evidence so 
clearly preponderates against them that the Court is persuaded 
that an injustice has resulted). 
Thus, if there is a sufficient basis in the evidence, 
or from lack of evidence, upon which reasonable minds could 
remain unconvinced that plaintiff proved, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that defendants defrauded him, the 
district court's judgment should be affirmed. See Centurian 
Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1977); accord 
Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983) 
(trial court's findings, when record is reviewed in light most 
favorable to them, are not to be disturbed if they find 
substantial support in the evidence); Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n v. Peart, 30 Utah 2d 201, 515 P.2d 614 (1973) (findings 
"supported by the evidence"). 
As an example of the foregoing, Cheever, 577 P.2d 
951, dealt with a situation in which the buyers of a business 
asserted they were entitled to rescind a contract because of 
the sellers' fraudulent representations. The trial court 
concluded that the buyers had not proven fraud by clear and 
convincing evidence, and this Court determined that the buyers 
had not met their burden of establishing that the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings of the trial court. 
This is so even though the buyers testified that the sellers 
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had told them that the business was earning a gross income of 
$10,000 per month even though the actual amount was approxi-
mately $3,500 per month; that the sellers misrepresented facts 
pertaining to advertising, the manner in which employees were 
paid, the amount of the loan from the bank, and the value of 
the equipment and supplies; and that the buyers relied on these 
false representations. The Court noted that the buyers had the 
opportunity to inspect the books of the business and thus did 
not reasonably rely on the sellers1 representations. 
In the present case, the evidence, when viewed in a 
light most favorable to the defendants, is not such that all 
reasonable minds would necessarily find fraud. There is 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings and 
conclusions. In this regard, the defendants did not knowingly, 
2 
willfully, or recklessly make false representations about 
the nature or character of the 1979 Buick Regal for the purpose 
of fraudulently inducing plaintiff to enter into the sales 
transaction. The Buick Regal, which was in a sense "new" in 
Although plaintiff appears to argue that defendants 
recklessly made false representations (Brief of Appellant at 
8-10), reckless misrepresentation was neither alleged in the 
pleadings nor raised at trial. Even so, this is not a 
situation in which defendants made representations even though 
they knew they had insufficient knowledge upon which to base 
such representations. Plaintiff also argues, for the first 
time on this appeal, that knowledge of falsity should be 
imputed to defendants. (Brief of Appellant at 8-10). As 
indicated herein, this is not a situation in which knowledge of 
falsity, if any, can be imputed. Further, the district court 
found that plaintiff failed to prove fraud, including the 
scienter element, by clear and convincing evidence. 
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that it had not been sold previously, was a demonstrator or 
driver's training car, and was represented to plaintiff as 
being such. (Tr. at 42, 47-49, 65-66, 68). Defendants did not 
conceal facts or pertinent information from plaintiff and did 
not intend to deceive plaintiff as to the character of the 
Buick Regal. This is manifested in part by the fact that 
plaintiff could have easily determined the nature of the Buick 
Regal by looking at it. In this regard, it would not have been 
difficult for plaintiff to have determined that the Buick Regal 
was a demonstrator or driver's training car or that it had 
mileage on it. Plaintiff had several opportunities to inspect 
the vehicle and even drove it before finalizing the purchase. 
(Tr. at 47, 54, 66). Plaintiff could easily have checked and 
understood the odometer, which was accurate, especially since 
plaintiff was a truck driver and claimed to be experienced in 
purchasing vehicles--having purchased several in the past. 
(Tr. at 29). Plaintiff carried on numerous discussions and 
negotiated with defendants as to price, extra features, and 
other similar matters. Throughout the discussions, plaintiff 
apparently was unconcerned about the "DT" or mileage notation 
on the papers or about defendants' comments that the vehicle 
was a demonstrator or driver's training car. (Tr. at 49-50). 
Further, defendants informed plaintiff that there was mileage 
on the vehicle and revealed that information on the Vehicle 
Buyer's Order. Plaintiff also admitted that he reviewed the 
Invoice and Order and understood the contents thereof. (Tr. at 
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32). Although plaintiff was obviously put on notice as to 
nature and character of the Buick Regal, plaintiff was 
inattentive to his own interests, did not question or suggest a 
lack of understanding of the various statements made by 
defendants, and seemed to have been more concerned about the 
vehicle's other features. To prove fraud, plaintiff was 
required to show that he exercised reasonable care and prudence 
before entering into the sales transaction and thus acted in 
reasonable reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. The 
policy for this requirement is to discourage inattention to 
one's own interests. Based on the foregoing, however, it is 
clear that plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the alleged 
misrepresentation. See Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 
610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980) (plaintiff is obliged to take 
reasonable steps to inform himself and to protect his own 
interest); Peart, 515 P.2d 614 (inspection would have revealed 
true facts); Schow v. Guardtone, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 
P.2d 643, 644-45 (1966) (buyer is under duty to act 
reasonably); Pace, 247 P.2d at 275 (where casual inspection of 
"river bottom land" would have disclosed it to be rocky and 
unfit for cultivation, buyers who had opportunity to inspect 
land but neglected to do so did not use reasonable care and 
diligence and were not entitled to rely upon vendor's 
representations as to its good quality). 
The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to defendants, does not clearly 
preponderate against the district court's findings and 
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conclusions that defendants did not defraud plaintiff in 
connection with the sale of the 1979 Buick Regal. In fact, the 
evidence clearly reveals that plaintiff did not meet his burden 
of establishing the elements of fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. The mere fact that the plaintiff may have made a bad 
bargain will not support a charge of fraud. Schow, 417 P.2d 
at 644-45. The district court's findings are supported by the 
evidence, and the conclusions are in conformity with those 
findings. The district court did not abuse its discretion. 
The judgment against plaintiff for no cause of action should 
not be disturbed on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR OR ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE DEPOSITION 
TESTIMONY OF WITNESS ROBERT H. POSEY. 
Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in 
admitting into evidence the deposition of Robert H. Posey 
("Posey"), taken during the course of this proceeding. 
However, as the following indicates, there was a sufficient 
showing to support the district court's finding and ruling of 
unavailability; and no evidence was presented to the contrary. 
In this regard, the district court properly admitted the former 
testimony evidence based on the representations made to it and 
furthermore did not abuse its discretion. 
A. The Requirements of Rule 804(a)(5), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, Were Satisfied. 
When defendants sought to have Posey's testimony 
admitted into evidence, the district court asked whether Posey 
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was "unavailable" as required under Rule 804(a)(5), U.R.E. 
Defendants' trial counsel responded: "He is [unavailable], 
your Honor. We have been unable to locate him. Mr. Heathman 
does not know where he's at. Mr. Heathman doesn't have any 
employee around anymore except for Walt Farmer. Mr. Farmer 
does not know where Mr. Posey is, either." (Tr. at 34-35). 
The district court then stated that "[defendants' counsel is] 
making a representation that the witness is unavilable, nobody 
knows where he is." (Tr. at 35). Defendants' counsel 
continued: "[N]o service of a subpoena has been attempted, 
because we didn't even have an address for him to even try 
that." (Tr. at 35). Plaintiff then stipulated to admission of 
the deposition testimony, reserving the right to make the usual 
objections, such as those based on relevancy. (Tr. at 35). 
When the testimony became more damaging to his position, 
plaintiff withdrew his stipulation. (Tr. at 48). 
Later, the district court reviewed the requirements of 
Rule 804(a)(5), U.R.E., and stated, "I don't think that [Rule 
804(a)(5)] requires the issuance of a [subpoena], when the 
proponent of the [declarant's statement] doesn't know where the 
[subpoena] can be served or has made some reasonable effort, 
which he says he has, to ascertain the whereabouts of the 
[declarant]." (Tr. at 51). Determining that the witness was 
unavailable for purposes of Rule 804(a)(5), U.R.E., the 
district court then ruled that under the circumstances of this 
case Posey's testimony was admissible as "former testimony" 
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under Rule bx < rocess tn* othei 
I > M S O U . i l l 1 (•"' II I I I I i f " II I I I I I ) J ! II I 
a showing of attempt nr ^ e circumstances 
where counsel indicates he ! as attempted tu locate the witness 
a . . . I 'H I 
admissible under Rule 804(b) 
For proper perspecti * * t must he noted initially 
t 9 8 I I  I in, j i l i I i. I i , \ i n n h i t Il u t l : i€ 
f edera. a:^ d sev* r<;: state? * 'j . t evidence which follow the 
modern approach + -><•<-^ n.- inclusior evidence and liberal 
t i exceptio i i, s S p e c i f i c, W 1 
the tendency ci modern decisn u:> i ^ enlarge the grounds upon 
which former testimony mav dmiLted xnto evidence. Ihe 
p< : \ 1:1 c:r; > fa voring the former testimony exception i s based upon 
the realization that former testimony evidence ii s often highly 
trustworthy and re 1 iab 1 e si nce 11: :i„e 1:€ st:ii m < \ n <." IIia s 1: e e i ,„ :i€ ] :ii i < I 
under sanction, of ai :i„ oatl :i„ a„i id subject 1 u t he i ight of the 
adverse party 1: o cross examine the witness Former testimony 
e v i d e i i c e i s s :i mp "Il ] i: :i„ c t :: j: • 5 1 :i„. it: :: 11:1: it, e :: 1: ji e c t :ii c: i i, s ::> i • I ::i i i a i: i 
agai n,st hearsay e\ i clei ic€ S e e !+ Weinstein' s Evidence H 
804(b) (1 )[02] at • 804- 82 (1985) (pri ox: testi niony i s often 
extremely reliable ) :; 11 "Il 1 1 : • ::>i <= s "F eclei a] Pi act:i c€ § 80 l 
V 1,11 2 3 9 (19 8 5 ) ('" ' I o i m e :i t: e s 11 m o n I, a 1 h e a r s a y i,„ s i n many 
respects the most reliable hearsay t\ idence. With the 
f 
construec >^  U U P liminatior * u ust ifiable 
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expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of 
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined." Rule 102, 
U.R.E. 
The present case is a prime example of a party's 
attempt to exclude reliable evidence. In this regard, Posey's 
testimony was given under oath and in the presence of 
plaintiff's counsel. Plaintiff had and took the opportunity to 
examine Posey on relevant matters and issues. Moreover, the 
deposition was taken only four months after the initial sales 
transaction between plaintiff and defendants whereas this case 
was tried more than five years later. Obviously, the events in 
question would have been fresher on Posey's mind at the time of 
the deposition. 
Although there is no Utah case law as of yet on Rule 
804(a)(5), U.R.E., there is relevant case law, relied upon 
herein, from other states and under the corresponding federal 
rule. The "unavailability" question, as it pertains to the 
hearsay exceptions, however, has arisen most often in criminal 
cases. In order to properly apply Rule 804(a)(5), U.R.E., in a 
civil case, it is important to note that a substantial 
difference exists between criminal and civil cases in 
connection with the hearsay rule and its exceptions. This is 
so because the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases is 
further limited to the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause 
whereby an accused has a very substantial and constitutional 
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right onfront h i s accuser* See Moore supra 
V Icwuiiuicix oi i Evidc>iu.v § 2 53 (i: ic ::i: e i i e s 
1984 ) Because of the overriding constitutional concerns in . 
criminal ras^s there may and should be stri cter requi rements 
a n d s ! i mi in in ill in I I in,1 i S e e W V i l i s t e d i :i, ' s s i ig ra at T 
804(a)[Olj, 804-38 (lesser standard prevails I n civil cases); 
Zenith Radio Corp, _v Matsushita Electric Industrial Co , 505 
F. Supp. ] 1 90, ] 249 (E.D Pa ] 980) (i t wot il d be inappropi i 
to app1y i n ci v 1 1 cases 11 i€ stri cter requirements and standards 
found in criminal cases). 
This Court has discussed 1 he unavailab, y^ 
requirement under Rule 62 (7 ) o f 1 he 1971 ru1es o f evidence, 
stating: 
The requirement is simply that the trial 
court be persuaded that the party has acted in 
good faith and with reasonable diligence and is 
unable to locate and bring the witness to the 
trial. The rule of review is comparable to that 
in most situations wherein it is the prerogative 
of the trial judge to make the determination. 
That is: he is allowed considerable latitude £ 
discretion; and that his ruling will not be 
reversed in the absence of a showing of clear 
abuse thereof. 
Gallegos v. Turner, 526 P.2d H28, 1129 30 (1974 ) In another 
case, State v. Brooks, 638 P. 2d 537 (Utah ] 931 ), this Court: 
ii:: S€ till: i E i ill :i i: ig • :: f till: HE t i I ail ji ldge • 
that the government . i ts to locate a witness were made i n 
good faith. Although the government did riot serve a subpoena 
mi mi i I I  II I  in in I  I 11 II11 • i 
attempts » the government could have been made, this Court 
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stated: "Although in retrospect other efforts might have been 
made, the [trial court's] determination does not appear to us 
to be an abuse of discretion/' Id. at 540; See also State v. 
Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976) (whether government has 
made a sufficient or reasonable effort to locate witness is 
within sound discretion of trial court). 
In the present case, plaintiff contends that the 
district court should have excluded Posey's testimony even 
though defendants' trial counsel represented at trial that 
despite their efforts, Posey's whereabouts was unknown and 
defendants could not locate Posey to request or compel his 
attendance at trial. If a proponent of a statement cannot find 
a witness, that witness is in effect unavailable for the 
purpose of compelling his attendance. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 
1405 (Chadbourn rev. 1974); Weinstein's, supra at II 
804(a)[01]. Defendants further represented to the trial court 
that they attempted to secure Posey's presence at trial, but to 
no avail. Defendants did not have Posey's address, had 
absolutely no idea where to find him, and could not even locate 
an address so that a subpoena could be served on him. See 
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (prosecutor had no 
indication of declarant's whereabouts); Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5) 
advisory committee note (absence from the hearing coupled with 
inability to compel attendance satisfies requirements of Rule 
804(a)(5)). 
Since defendants were unable to ascertain Posey's 
whereabouts and would have been unable to serve the subpoena, 
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:ii t would have been futile or useless to go through the steps of 
havii iig a subpoena i ssi ie :3 Ii 1 I 'eople v F" org a son, 
3 1 356, 160 (Hal Rptr 263 (1 979), the value of a subpoena 
issued lor an i unavailable witness was held to be worthless. 
i 
[I]t is said that little, if any, importance will 
be placed upon the pro forma act of delivering a 
subpoena "in a timely fashion to the sheriff for 
service upon the missing witness," when the party 
is unable to suggest a place where he may be 
served. . . . And "no good could be accomplished 
by requiring that an officer [or the interested 
party] make a pretense of looking for the witness 
in a number of places where he could not 
reasonably be expected t o be found "" ' 
Id, at • 363, 160 Ca] Rptr at: 266 (emphasis added : * -u 
People v. Linder 5 Ca] 3 : I 3 ! f2 3 ! •: 
P. 2d 1226, 12?9 (19/1), See also Roberts, 448 •. 
("|t"|he law does not requi re the doir> 4 *• * 3 " I 
accord is United States v. Terrazas-Montano, 
(8th Cir. 1984' '" '".is instance "* » require the government 
to show that I L unable * * *• .' 
witnesses under Federal Rules Evidence 
would compel a useless act, ) 
Based un L i 
predi-.ate was shown i , : mtroduct ^ ;, deposi •* 
testimony : tnstant case d i s t r i c t court heard 
accepted defenda i 
determined tha unavai lable for purpose, \ 1^ 
8 0 4 ( a ) ( 5 ) , ll1 I" I, !'\l"'j lividence was introduced to support; a 
r n n i r a i " ' ' i mi I n nip, m in 11 l il I i i j L 
- 1 9 -
court to accept or reject counsel's representations [about 
unavailability]." Bailey v. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Co., 613 F.2d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir. 1980), quoting Castilleja 
v. Southern Pacific Co., 445 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1971). 
See United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 1982) 
(absent any showing by defendant that government could have 
obtained the presence of witness at trial or that government 
acted in bad faith, there is no basis for disturbing trial 
court's ruling); Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. 
Lobo, 391 P.2d 819 (Okla. 1964) (it is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to determine the degree of 
preliminary proof necessary to admit former testimony). The 
district court did not abuse its discretion in accepting 
defendants' counsel's explanation and representations that 
Posey's whereabouts was unknown and that despite defendants' 
efforts to procure his attendance, Posey could not be located. 
Admission of Posey's testimony into evidence was proper, and 
3 
the district court's judgment should be affirmed. 
Rule 32, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
("U.R.C.P."), an independent basis for admission of deposition 
testimony by way of Rule 802, U.R.E., is another indication of 
the realization that former testimony evidence is often 
reliable and trustworthy. Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3)(B) & (D), 
U.R.C.P., a deposition may be used in trial if the witness is 
at a distance greater than 100 miles from the place of the 
trial or the party offering the deposition is unable to procure 
the attendance of the witness by subpoena. As represented to 
the district court, defendants could not even locate Posey's 
whereabouts to serve a subpoena on him or to determine whether 
he was within 100 miles from the place of trial. 
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B . The Requirements of Rule 804(b)(1) ,  Utal 1 Rules 
of Evidence, Were Satisfied. 
Plaintiff contends that Posey's testimony should have 
b opportunity to 
cross examine Posey during the trial, , 70). 
However, is set forth herein, ill i' r i mat uie requirements 
c IHUII I I HI hi I h I I I  I III w e r e s a l i s t i e d . 
Posey1s testimony was given ; i deposition taken i n 
compliance with the 1aw in the cours< : 1 Ie • s a m • s f: • i oceedi ng, 
tl ti s acti on; there was a clear i dentity : if \ ar til es . PlaintI f f , 
against whom Posey's testimony was offeree trial, certainly 
had an oppor tun i 1
 ( II i In m | i i i inn i i 
test imony h y direct, H U M . , UI r e d i r e c t examina t i on. 
Especially revealing is the fact that it was plaintiff's 
counsel who deposed ai id examined Posey Ii i • iete i iiii i: ii i lg 
whether a similar m<>ti ve to develop the testimony existed at 
the time when former testimony was elicited mourts search 
f I III III I III III III III III III III 11 I III I III | \ l;j 1 
• issues proceedings *..- > ft i client Ly similar » 
assui that the opposing party had a meaningful opportunity 
' i * i i i mil II i i I I I ii iiiii'i1 1 1 i ill i i i i 1 1 iii I I J i c II I I 1 i i l l United 
States v. W i n g a t e , VMI i" 1M HI'l , HI „ { ,M m • I M - h ) , C l e a r l y , 
the issues at 1 he- d e p o s i t i o n were sufficiently similar it mil 
i in i I a 'r 
motive _-_» develop Posey's testimony **ve: hough the parties 
may have been i *•- initial stapac of the -/-:o Se« 
DeLuryea Laboratories. 
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1983) (actual extent of plaintiff's cross examination was 
unimportant; likewise, plaintiff's change of counsel at trial 
was irrelevant); Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 
F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1969) (cross examination during deposition 
was limited only by counsel's choice); see also In re Related 
Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (since 
defendant had ample opportunity to examine deponent, 
defendant's failure to rigorously do so was insufficient to 
exclude the highly relevant testimony); Weinstein's, supra at 
U 804(b)(1)[02], 804-81 (when deposition taken solely for 
discovery is offered at trial, courts have not accorded any 
significance to the slight incentive for cross examination 
which existed when deposition was taken). 
C. Admission of Robert H. Posey's Testimony into 
Evidence Was Harmless Error. 
Even if this Court determines that the district court 
abused its discretion in admitting Posey's testimony into 
evidence, admission of that testimony was harmless error. In 
this regard, evidence independent of Posey's testimony supports 
the district court's determinations that plaintiff did not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that defendants 
knowingly made false representations to induce plaintiff to 
rely thereon and that he reasonably relied on the alleged 
misrepresentations. See In re Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111 
(Utah 1982) (improper admission of hearsay evidence was 
harmless error where exclusion of such evidence would not 
present the likelihood of a different result); Thatcher v. 
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M e r r i a m , I ' 1 l l l . i h I ' M , <i | ( i [ ,'(| i"Mi > 9 i (evidence -
i n i p i u'|»f r I ''i a H i n in I I i i I I ( . I 
c o u r t : ) . 
defendants did not i i i any way knowingly 
cum - i II le i latux e ::: i: 
character : . Regal. This is manifested : r: r«:* 
the evidence, ndependenL ui * s testimony, establishing 
that the odome .: »,as arrnrat, ; „.* vehi c] e was ] ocated on a 
light-,: lv r i" I * st j " . . and plaintiff was given full access to 
the very vehi. " rended to purchase ai id w as p,i ven sever.] I 
opportunities throughout the negotiations and purchase 
transact!cw inspect and examine that vehicle (Tr. at 1 9; 
1 ) : f si in 
n a t u r e t h a t :i t ' ' w i ] 1 i I c t 1 i e" i i i in e i e s u s p i c :i o n o i i nnu e nd o .f f 
Taylor v, Gasor, Inc. , 607 P. 2d 293, 295 (Utah 1980) I! ?< ::»t 
that defendants iraudulently misrepresented the true nature r 
the h »-k Regn: ie also failed to establish that he reasonably 
r Il ' I  1 1 in I  , 1 i i d II mi mi ii-. f i e i I i o n II 
would have disclosed the nature of and mileage < the Buick 
Reg&- Although plaintiff looked at the vehicle and drove it 
t :;:i i ig t 
13), 1 ie was apparently more concerned aboi < ispe-.is and 
features of the ca/ i: lie >i eo \- plaintiff, who claimed 
P x p P r i m n c e d I n pn i r cha s I ng i r• • ill 
documents that he admitted he understood (Tr A '»/ » ,^ :, 
which were noted the " 'DT ' ' designation and lac coxictL outgoing 
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mileage. Plaintiff's lack of concern for his own interest 
throughout the purchase transaction, as indicated by the 
independent evidence, cannot be grounds for a finding of fraud; 
admission of the deposition testimony was harmless error. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT FAIL TO MAKE FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, 
ARGUMENTS, ISSUES, AND THEORIES PRESENTED TO IT. 
Plaintiff brought this action, claiming that 
defendants knowingly made false representations and 
fraudulently induced him to buy the 1979 Buick Regal. 
4 
Plaintiff sought damages and rescission of the contract. 
(R. at 128, Finding 11). In accordance with the evidence, 
arguments, issues, and theories raised in the pleadings and 
presented at trial, the district court addressed and resolved 
the material factual issues, specifically finding, among other 
things, (1) that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof 
regarding allegations of fraud in that plaintiff failed to 
convince the district court that defendants knowingly made 
false statements to plaintiff regarding the character of the 
Buick Regal or that defendants fraudulently induced plaintiff 
into purchasing the Buick Regal; (2) that plaintiff failed to 
prove that defendants acted with scienter; and (3) that 
As examples of the many cases in which the 
plaintiff seeks to rescind the contract and/or to obtain 
damages in connection therewith, see Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 
896 (Utah 1981) and Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 
548 P.2d 898 (Utah 1976) (purchaser of a dry cleaning business 
sued in fraud for damages and to rescind the contract). 
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plaintiff failed to convince I In* disfrirt court that defendants 
c • a c 11 i a 1 a c t s :: f f i: 11 m i II i I II i • n I i II I t 11« I «i 111 t: ci m m 1 1 t e i t i n y 
deceptive act c i practice which would support rescission. (R 
at 128-29; Findings 1 2- 1 4 ) . The district court then concluded 
thai pi a J iit::i ff' s coniplaint was dismissed for no cause nt act i i 
and that plaintiff was not eiiti filed to rescission or damages. 
A. "TI le District Court "Was Not Required to Make 
Findings and Conclusions with Regard to Breach of 
Contract or Unjust Enrichment Claims. 
Plaintiff argues on this appeal that the district 
c o u r t n '' inn i v inn r I 11 n i in 11 n 11 1 11 
breach * contract unjust enrichment theories laintifffs 
argument without merr . Breach contract .> i unjust 
e ~ • IE!:: 
p l e a d i n g s and were presentee r a i s e d it t r i a l . In 
fact , record below iv - in-.r * • - - ~^s i.id of amy mention of 
s - il il i il in " , 1 mi in mi il  i mi in I i mi II HI II in i Il 
be required indings and conclusions that plaintiff 
Plaintiff argues that defendants were unjustly 
enriched (Brief of Appellant at 19-20) but cites to no portion 
of the record indicating that such a claim was presented to the 
district court for determination. Plaintiff also argues that 
the district court failed to make findings with respect to a 
breach of contract claim (Brief of Appellant at 18-19), stating 
that he alleged (citing Amended Complaint 1111 3-4, 6, 13-14) and 
argued (citing Tr. at 71-73, 78) such a claim in the proceeding 
below. However, even a cursory reading of plaintiff's cites 
reveals that plaintiff did not allege or put in issue a breaih 
of contract claim and did not present such claim to the 
district court for determination, In fact, in closing argument 
plaintiff stated: "[T]he plaintiff has brought this case in 
the form of a cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation 
. " (Tr i • J: 71 ) 
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now contends should have been made. The district court 
committed no error; on the contrary, it appropriately addressed 
the material issues in accordance with the allegations and 
arguments presented in the pleadings and at trial. 
Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 
645 P.2d 667 (Utah 1982), is in accord with the foregoing. In 
that case the defendants contended on appeal that a covenant 
not to compete was contrary to public policy. Although that 
contention was raised as a defense in the defendants' answer, 
no argument was made to the trial court on that issue and no 
evidence was presented in connection thereto. This Court 
stated that it "will not consider on appeal issues which were 
not submitted to the trial court and concerning which the trial 
court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact 
or law." Id. at 672; see Phillips v. JCM Development Corp., 
666 P.2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
B. The District Court Sufficiently Complied with the 
Requirements of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Although it remains defendants' contention that the 
district court was not required to make findings and 
conclusions regarding breach of contract or unjust enrichment 
claims, in that such claims were not presented to the district 
court for determination, defendants submit that even assuming 
the district court was required to make such findings and 
conclusions, the district court satisfied this requirement by 
addressing and resolving the material issues raised in the 
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pleadings and all 1.1 i a I il Ik all 1.28-29) saving s u f f i c i e n t l y 
c o i i i p l i e d I i I llhi I ' M I "i '" il .1 I , 11 I1 I I" , 1 II i . . , i 1 1 l i i H I i I 
dismissed plaintiff's complaint foi no t,au,sr of action The 
findings and conclusions preclude any reasoiiab Le conclusion 
of I "i (* i I 11.! in in a g a i n s t a II Il o f p > 11 a :i i: 11 :i f f ' s c 1 a a in s i r i - proceeding 
below See Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977) 
(substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) i s sufficient even, 
though t r i a1 court does not negate ea ch a 1 ] e gat i on; f i i iding s 
and conclusions wi] 1 support judgment "though they are very 
general ); see also Parks v, Z i o n s t i r s t N a l l_ilanKi U I I1" II"ill 
5901 (Utah 1983) (findings do not specifically negative 
defendants 1' allegations infer trial coujt'.s denial 
thei eof) ; Mowe: . _. ^ :hlar:. j.^  *.Jl ' ' . » 
(Supreme Court assumes that tri;: < ourt imnui facts iccord 
with its decision where under the evidence it could reasonably 
S I 1 II I m l ) . 
C Plaintiff Did Not Request an Amendment or Object 
to the District Court's Findings and Conclusions. 
Even assuming the distri ct court was required 
findings and conelusi ons wi th respect: 5 breach contract W* 
i cl lme i it ::::1 a a lis J: .in 
amendment o :i : o b j e c t ill: :  ill: 1 le f indings and cone lus ions a t t lie 
trial 1 evf1 and i s precluded from challenging them on this 
appeal i «»,; oi ds i IMI II H i 
proceeding below, the disti court could have made additional 
findings, necessary v.n .HIS M address plaintiff s 
chment claims. Defects 
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curable in the proceeding below cannot be relied upon by 
plaintiff if the district court had no opportunity to rule 
thereon. In this regard, Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P., provides in 
pertinent part: "Upon motion of a party not later than ten 
days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings 
or make additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly." Rule 52(b) then makes an exception to the above 
requirement by allowing a party to raise on appeal the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings even 
though the party failed to make an objection in district 
court. That exception does not apply in this instance since 
plaintiff is not arguing sufficiency of the evidence but is 
contending that the district court failed to make certain 
findings. Rule 52(b) therefore controls; and plaintiff is 
precluded from challenging the district court's failure, if 
any, to make findings regarding breach of contract or unjust 
enrichment claims. 
D. Any Failure to Make Findings and Conclusions with 
Regard to Breach of Contract or Unjust Enrichment 
Claims Was Harmless Error. 
Even assuming that the district court was required to 
make findings and conclusions with respect to breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment claims, any failure to make such 
findings or conclusions was harmless error. The evidence 
adduced at trial supports the district court's determination of 
no cause of action against plaintiff, even on breach of 
contract or unjust enrichment theories. 
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As indicated above, plaintiff and defendants entered 
into an arm's-length transaction in which plaintiff agreed to 
purchase a certain 1979 Buick Regal at a negotiated price. The 
district court specifically found that no fraud was involved. 
As part of the purchase price, plaintiff traded in his truck 
and received a credit therefor. Plaintiff signed a Vehicle 
Buyer's Order that correctly recited the outgoing odometer 
reading and an Invoice and Order that described the vehicle as 
a "DT". Defendants informed plaintiff that the Buick Regal--
although in a sense a "new" vehicle, in that it had not been 
sold previously--was a demonstrator or driver's training car. 
(Tr. at 42, 47-48, 49). Plaintiff was put on notice as to the 
character of the Buick Regal and knew or should have known what 
he was buying, having had several opportunities to read the 
papers that he signed and to inspect the vehicle--which he test 
drove before finalizing the purchase. Defendants performed 
their side of the bargain by delivering the Buick Regal to 
plaintiff and did not breach their contract. Plaintiff, 
however, failed to perform his side of the bargain in that he 
did not make payments under the financing arrangement. As a 
result of plaintiff's default, defendants were entitled to 
repossess the vehicle. This repossession did not constitute 
unjust enrichment. The evidence, when viewed in a light 
As another indication that defendants were not 
unjustly enriched, plaintiff remained in possession of the 
Buick Regal for approximately six months before defendants 
repossessed it. (Tr. at 72). During that period and in an 
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most favorable to defendants, supports the district court's 
determination of no cause of action; any failure on the part of 
the district court to make findings and conclusions concerning 
breach of contract or unjust enrichment claims was therefore 
harmless error. See Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780 (Utah 
1944) (even though failure of the trial court to make finding 
was error, it would not require reversal since had such 
findings been made the judgment would have been the same in any 
event); Piper v. Hatch, 86 Utah 292, 43 P.2d 700 (1935) (where 
had court made finding, judgment would have been the same, and 
hence a new trial would be futile, error in not making finding 
on issue was harmless). 
ARGUMENT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF CONTRACT AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT CLAIMS CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON THIS APPEAL. 
Plaintiff asserts breach of contract and unjust 
enrichment claims for the first time on this appeal, not having 
put those claims in issue in the pleadings or at trial. In 
this regard, it is well established that issues not presented 
to the trial court for determination are not reviewable on 
appeal. See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Utah Security 
Mortgage, Inc., 701 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1985); First Equity Corp. 
(n.6 continued) 
effort to satisfy plaintiff, defendants allowed plaintiff to 
return several times to defendants' service department. (Tr. 
at 29-30). On each return, plaintiff requested that certain 
work be done on the vehicle; and each time, defendants 
performed the work. 
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v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887, 892 n.5 (Utah 1975), 
citing Davis v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970) 
(appellant cannot raise a theory on appeal for first time 
different from that presented to trial court). This Court has 
aptly stated: 
"Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is 
the final settlement of controversies, requires 
that a party must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the trial 
court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of litigation." 
Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), 
quoting Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 
470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). 
ARGUMENT V 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF JUST DAMAGES AND COSTS. 
Pursuant to Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, defendants are entitled to an award of just damages 
and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, for this 
frivolous appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully request this Court to affirm 
the judgment of the district court and to award defendants 
damages and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
incurred in connection with this appeal. 
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DATED this #4 day of December, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Stre, 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
Respondents 
uite 1600 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ff — day of December, 
1985, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS, postage prepaid, to: 
Randall J. Holmgren 
SHIELDS, SHIELDS & HOLMGREN 
The Valley Tower, Ninth Floor 
50 West Broadway 
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RULES 
Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1985): 
If the court shall determine that a motion made 
or appeal taken under [the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure] is either frivolous or for delay, it shall 
award just damages and single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. 
Rule 32(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or 
an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a 
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of 
evidence applied as though the witness were then 
present and testifying, may be used against any party 
who was present or represented at the taking of the 
deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in 
accordance with any of the following provisions: 
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not 
a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if 
the court finds . . . (B) that the witness is at a 
greater distance than 100 miles from the place of 
trial or hearing, or is out of the United States . . . 
or (D) that the party offering the deposition has been 
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by 
subpoena . . . . 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; and in granting or 
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for 
purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the 
extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered 
as the findings of the court. Findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of 
motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion except 
as provided in Rule 41(b). 
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Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than ten 
days after entry of judgment the court may amend its 
findings or make additional findings and may amend the 
judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When 
findings of fact are made in actions tried by the 
court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency 
of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter 
be raised whether or not the party raising the 
question has made in the district court an objection 
to such findings or has made either a motion to amend 
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new 
trial. 
Rule 102, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983): 
These rules [of evidence] shall be construed 
to secure fairness in administration, elimination 
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion 
of growth and development of the law of evidence 
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined. 
Rule 802, Utah Rules of Evidence (1983): 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided 
by law or by these rules. 
Rule 62(7), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971): 
"Unavailable as a witness" includes 
situations where the witness is . . . (d) absent 
beyond the jurisdiction of the court to compel 
appearances by its process, or (e) absent from 
the place of hearing because the proponent of his 
statement does not know and with diligence has 
been unable to ascertain his whereabouts. 
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30-20-9 
GARY L. CHRYST. 
Attorney for Defendants
 r __ 
42 North University Ave. ?Mir> "/::'.'i:^.Pf. . 
Suite 4, P.O. Box 1045 ' ; • . . : - . . ' 
Provo, Utah 84603 !•-;..- ,,,„ , 
Telephone: 375-3121 '^' Abb ' 3 fif /,:
 2 3 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— o o o O o o o — 
HARLEN W. BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 52,832 
HARRY HEATHMAN, INC.; HARRY 
HEATHMAN d/b/a HEATHMAN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY; and HEATHMAN PROPERTIES, 
Defendants. 
— o o o O o o o — 
This matter came on regularly for trial on the 13th day of May, 1985. 
Plaintiff was represented by Randall J. Holmgrem and Defendants were 
represented by Gary L. Chrystler. As a preliminary matter, Defendant, Harry 
Heathman Inc., indicated, by and through counsel, that it would not prosecute 
its Counterclaim and the same was dismissed. Plaintiff was sworn and testifi 
concerning the allegations in his Complaint and in support of his cause of 
action against the Defendants. At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, portio 
of the Deposition of Robert H. Posey, salesman for Harry Heathman Inc., were 
published and admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of evidence the 
matter was taken under advisement by the Court. Having reviewed the testimon 
and evidence submitted and heard the arguments and being fully advised in 
the premises, the Court now makes and enters its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 




2. Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, is a resident of Glenrock, Wyoming. 
3. Harry Heathman Inc., is a Utah Corporation licensed to do business 
in the state of Utah. 
4. Harry Heathman is a resident of the state of Utah. 
5. On or about September 12, 1979, Harlen W. Brown was the owner of a 
1978 Chevrolet automobile. 
6. On or about September 12, 1979, Harry Heathman Inc., sold Plaintiff 
a 1979 Buick Regal automobile for the total sum of $12,175.72. 
7. Plaintiff traded in his 1978 Chevrolet automobile and received a 
credit as a down payment therefor in the sum of $4,473.64. 
8. The balance of the contract purchase price of $5,915.44 was financed 
over a period of 48 months at an annual interest rate of 13.30 percent. 
9. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, on September 12, 1979, Plaintiff 
executed a Vehicle Buyer's Order which indicated that the vehicle purchased 
by him was a new 1979 Buick Regal and that it had an outgoing odometer reading 
of 11,946 miles. 
10. Also on September 12, 1979, to facilitate financing, Plaintiff 
executed a Conditional Sales Contract and Security Agreement which indicated 
the vehicle he was purchasing from Harry Heathman Inc., was a new 1979 Buick 
Regal automobile. 
11. After purchase of the 1979 Buick Regal , Plaintiff brought suit 
against Defendants for recision of the purchase contract claiming Defendants 
had fraudulently induced the purchase by knowingly and falsely misrepresenting 
the fact that the 1979 Buick Regal had been a driver's training car. 
12. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof regarding allegations 




Heathman Inc., or any of its employees or authorized agents knowingly made 
false statements to Plaintiff regarding the character of the automobile 
purchased nor did Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized 
agents or employees by their acts fraudulently induce Plaintiff into purchasi 
the 1979 Buick Regal. 
13. Plaintiff also failed to meet his burden of proof regarding establv 
ing by clear and convincing evidence that Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or 
any of its authorized agents or employees acted with scienter in this matter 
14. Plaintiff, Harlen W. Brown, has therefore, failed to establish his 
cause of action by failing to convince the Court by clear and convincing evi 
that the Defendant, Harry Heathman Inc., or any of its authorized agents or 
employees committed actual acts of fraud in this transaction nor did Harry 
Heathman Inc. or any of its authorized employees or agents commit any decept 
act or practice which would support recision of the parties purchase and sal 
contract. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed for no cause of action 
against all Defendants. 
3. No costs are awarded either party. 
DATED this X ^ S ^ d a y o 
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30-20-11 
GARY L. CHRYSTLtR 
Attorney for Defendants 
42 North University Ave. 
Suite 4, P.O. Box 1045 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: 375-3121 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
— o o o O o o o — 




f'H If. 2? 
"•'OH: 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 52,832 
HARRY HEATHMAN, INC.; HARRY 
HEATHMAN d/b/a HEATHMAN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY; and HEATHMAN PROPERTIES, 
Defendants. 
— o o o O o o o — 
Pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law heretofore 
entered in this matter, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Counterclaim of the Defendants is hereby dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. 
2. That the Complaint of the Plaintiff is hereby dismissed for no cause 
of action as to all Defendants. 
3. No costs are to be awarded either party 
lisX^Way tf^&JU^ DATED th  , 1985. 
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C O N D I T I O N S 
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VEHICLE CHASSIS FURNISHED HEREUNOER EXCEPT AS MAY BE EXPRESSED IN WRITING BY THE DEALER FOR S U C H U S E O 
MOTOR VEHICLE OR MOTOR CHASSIS. WHICH WARRANTY. IF SO EXPRESSED IN WRITING. IS INCORPORATED HEREIN * s D 
MADE A PART HEREOF 
7 In case the vehicle covered by t h * order • a used vehicle, no warranty or representation « mad* as to tha eitent such veh*«« nas been used 
regardless of the rrvieege shown on the speedometer of se«d used vehicle 
• In th* event that the transactor rwiftwd to m ttve order is not a cash transaction, the buyer harem, before or at th* time of de*ver> of tn« 
vahicle ordered, and m accordance vnth the terms and conditions o* payments m^cated on me front of th« order wnt eaecute a cono<t>on«i 
sales contraci. or such other form of socunty agreement as may be regu*ed to complete t h * transaction upon a ttma credit pr<* bast 
9 in th* event that it becomes necessary for Dealer to enforce any of the terms and rondttey* of t h * order, buyer agrees to pay reasonable 
attorney's fees and coun coats 
TO T h * order * Non-Transferable 
T T T h * order « subfOCt to credrt approval by a financing ewtitution and «* the event rt * unacceptable to the financing institution buver w« 
return vehicle covered by t h * order Mwned*tafy to Dealer if de*very has been made 
12 LIABILITY INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR BOO«LY INJURY AND OAMAGE CAUSED TO OTHERS IS NOT INCLUDED IS' T«>S 
AGREEMENT 
'3 BUYER REPRESENTS he * IB years of age o* older, and no ced-t has bee* ««tend*d except as appears on the r«»f«« uc* 
T« T h * ptder constitutes me entwe terms »na agreements •etwee* th# r » n i « h»t»to *• reference to the veh<le ordered nereuno*» 
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lIT. I |e«iwt««cf| C O N D I T I O N A L S A L E C O N T R A C T 
Ummmmmtu^mnU^mm^m f O K^ 2 5 B 7 3 , SALT LAKE C t T T t CTTAW t 4 W 
•»»* to* C*fc*«,-««*« M « A***,, fi«ci«g« U*Nt • « / « Ca*; 
MAI I X N V M O W ? 
124 If 130 C 
O I K H , HT A 4 0 W 
L_ 
I * 1 * 1 * * • < * ,
 M m * * p * ftvrCf fm««Mi( «ll * * u i f * « * twr«ri , » * | l , * « M v f t f h l ft***. » « « . . ^ . ^ ^  ^  _~~ * . ~ 
HAMY iir^TttrtAN.rifr. 
m ?*ntTw too wesr 
WWW, UfAM 44601 
; PUUNTIPrS 
I ttMMT 
I NO. / 
« * V !•»?«» | tj WICK 
« - l « « » - H I « t t . J w ( l » 
»f !»«*»- * K f + f M t f » * « • * * H«Htt »l I * * . * * * * ! W * 
20ft 0 
I 





]. UM»AI0 tAUMCC Or CASH ftlCC (OHiaraiw M M M Nam I • * 7) 
1 OTMU CMAKCS 
•A Cast af *«««M«0 r*oK* Otmtt Uto<«»c( 
• • • Caaf a» OatMMtK ««cft«Mcat l««tk«M •<»»•••««« 
•fTCt HIT CHOOXf TMf ftttO« TKtOVCM «*MCM fMC MSMlHCf M I l«0 • ft TO I f MTtMfO 
C Cast «f &*<•*» >«un«w.« to* I M t«» *«««< 
cfvuutf m m w m if urr MCM MSMAAXC a PJOT nomvv IT ICUXI 
wKiMmt i i ***3ZU«« SlBCLt 
W H t M i M M i d gXWMt > i| Hm4** m* H—t») 
Q OVw* (Utctibt) 
* r c n Afftovti: i ecu* TO mm tm ctrofTw msmuu CMCCWO uon rot m ma 
*iON". |4t| 
^ , / ^ r , - M r , 
5.13 WK.EM 7-59. 0. Ofc^fmtOawiia) . lAfTTT I W . 
{ I«*«M *4fm Ufntim fm (Ntmut) 
. _ J , . CarbfcjU a< fat. f « 
C Omar(Oatento) . H I T 5 C K V i C £ CQKTRAC.T V> />0 , fWK) 
5 UNMIO tAlAia-AMOUNT flNANCCO(S^Mf(ilamiJaM«) 
i flNAMCC CNAICE 
7. TOTAL Of »ArwCNTS(SawafiHiiiiSa<NjI) 
L OtrCttf0 f ArMfMT fttCC (Um d iMm M H t ) . 
% ANNUAL PEHCEMTAGC M T C 
10. »Ar«CNr SCNtOVLC TMT* i<#>f» r *^ i (H < -0«Myaa^*»^^»a(»««>»rM<r t i^«*««$*< i^ fc ( ta *«* r i 
I-
L I A I ^ I A O I 
7 . ^ . . <«ci 
. U H L «f» 
intfaimMtt «f J_ lr«n,4fi>ac«*.i 10/77/70 
-M »««t*u«t*rtr*c» 
« 2 3Q,^Q.i4Ci 
»• y . 7 w " fL^?> 
Attf *il»4«kt*« • * < • it « H ( t t M tMCt t*X »W0Wt I- >-
•4MC» M J * at no i*u (••« «M« It 9m Wrar IM* H 
m tfftfvtar MOWW «> m« bvr* 
aat to « u ^ $! rf r o a ^ , ^ H M ^ . M C M R € r-Mr*> l» p « ^ u ^ . fc^^ 
^•-K. < •.*. 1 ^ ..^  M«^ «*« ^ „„m< .^.^ w - , n 3 i s i r sari^L^rrL!: , ^ ^ - •«- •*-« -
an|-..% Myall, • «| ^ m t n t i . ^ . . ^ ^ „ t a v i m t mt% m ZJZrlJSrJ*?? T " * ?. • ^ , t o « • * * «N • * af 71 rf fV **«» ^,tillt4tt rt 
ItytH ^ n o l Dim<f« towtwet 
Tf. 
I 0f»otii6(f C O N * * - * * ; MM Mtact aw •> IN »«No«*n| 
3 M Ca«c»ei-««»H Mtl«*«|.f« ( !««« mt U»**ti ****** O w t j f 
^ 1 OfgrjciM Csm^fftf^^ -<iva^«-'-f T*««t „, C»m»«rt AgM^nji Ca^t^ 
^_ f«f f**P *A0 C0mt«if« Atffi.lonji Cav«w 
0»t««*i rf #«-»e-to—>| •«< i*>» cam f j a»ai«< *>,•»,»,»««*<,, Q , 
T»a W . . C , , » . , , , M ^ , ^ , , w u , c t «»« . „ ^ . ^ ^ f t t t ^ ^ ^ >w< r < > t f t y i M M M _ _ ^ ^ ^ 
••Oftwuf HtdMMit IfaaMaMi two —it 
fcHMWicr Cam#ja« M I C 
SALT LAKE CITT, UTAH 
•>»• Q J4 m»»»% 0 M000 *»m ••<>*••>» «<«•« i-u 
f
«« n w.*: IA /VWV) 
£ W> Ot+rt**t ^J ISO Or* * ! * * , j t >M^<+~ 
Q T«i h . l . W b o n a C » M * ) tf U . * . — v - < 
M n n i c c mrTHnrr ANO NCAITN orauiriM(ii 
• M i M ^ f * U T « » I * - ^ fcr Ub b r a i l Q I M i a 
rtf t f fJihMrbllUal ^ ^ i AJg^^VgfiQft.t<iL^^^;M 
H t A T f t . F L n f t O A 
"7H 
' <iifM«K< J kyw itMtw Knur « « m « t f f t l l v y . k ^ 1 5 , 0 0 0 
Airy Motoci of THIS COHSUMCI CICOIT coirTMa B suma TO AH riLut «Mn „ „ „ „ 
ft1^60005 M U , W , C B °"W"CD w «^ *«wo«^ w ^ ^ f f o r T M ^ C00l° M a w *CAl«T m 
WT DC££0 AMOONTS fAJO IT THC 0CIT0I NCICUN0C& " W H D S MCHOf. WCOVttT NCttUNDCR IT TMf OCBTO* SMALL 
C » o r t < fa. fyintupHcil.. * * tf wMcft wM f t t r f fW * . H * r * » * h trtnewlrtftd t , . kvytr. thli g , , „ _ 0 < , / l 2 / 7 n 
» — . . 11 / 
' aapar 1 / 
A **> . /l_Tl 
5ST..U. ILARtT HCATBMAII, fVC. 
•f 
f»MI#| 
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Tfti .nirAT»>Aa . f t ,* .« 
AOOfTIOHAL Tf I M S 
t far ftt aarant af Mcarftj ptymttt af ftt tafajattoa btiattdir. attar M M t to . taf * t * to«t a ft**** tottrttt ft aaaj prop** t a * • * * ftli|*iM • M l H « u i » 
I i t tantftr, rtttaat, art i win ar inl| i t iat af ftt) catorad tr aty mtorttt fttrafar. aad m tow, tftftytft twbwattmi tf uft aftptryy tto* r i t jm bayft fca« b« abfajai-n 
•ftiftltr to ftt mat af ftt traoafar aad mtomatt af •tftoft rajati l i n i i i i . IN awl Mi«toar" ato* I t aMirriiil M radar** to ftt ttbjiijiwt baa* tf » « caftract am* uc* 
tnaiftr aad mtjutftt. tact* at may to tfttrvna part«aftr1y ttata* tort*, ttrtr ttof lata uft praaarty M M tf at taats, tott aft tactaaraacn t«d any tan af tarn* ftaf may to 
C by atttor ai rttotu m dractoryt tM#atf atoN bt aaaj • tana* at a* aa*t«aal part af tto abtojatiat tacarad bwtttdar lay* abaft ttt m utf praptrty *«taSy " ¥ P t » ar tor a* atoll aat mttoat taprau ptrawuita tf taftor tramlar ar tfttrwnt duaau af pay wttrnt« ton cantrad ar u*J praptrty 
1 (a) I* tto war* adtwr f|) ttot Hit otftntto* 94 
aaraaf to« tto* ft* Ml torn, * tail cantraetaTrJ) * * • 
pttjari) utfttotat ft to tfad—to and idntataty oaiaia 
-^jt^Ki-*-"^-^-*-* 
to * amtvnt aaaaf ft fta as* tf well maaraact caatrwf uftty ftt aato^ t i fto taato Iwraafttar 
_ ^ * Q t e * a a i « * a t o ^ f t a t o . | i M ^ 
a»aw ato fto tot»rtnctwaH>j ft tmt* fto t a t t t a t t ^ 
. ^ ^ — u - - i . ^ * , _ . . — . «aftaftmtt*fttadM«ftftptacartstmt » f l ) M c H m a i K W < f t W « < » i i t o 
h maartact m ctacaftot Ito aaytr W* ftaf tto MftK may ptaeart mwranct ct««f 
„ _ want a« amaaat taaaf ft Ito eat) tf u<d mtoranct cam** tatoto tto utof t ••«**« 
•r atoff to MBJ to tto bay* tttor to mat* tf • raSaflft*. ft tto aittat tf wc* caat • tto amount It to craMad and apt** partaaai It tto ra*.wt*t af tto » « * * » { wb 
* * * * * * (?) • « • » prtinftft tr» Hut itplgjblt, ar i t iawaiat toftfto< w*k wttrttl t t m< amt»ft af Ito togtonl U»M ctttrad rait, H at aft1<»»tl Mil tf Ito aHf«»« tacww) 
tortttftar, to attor cast tt ato« mart tttoieaNjr affttr at a t « « t by Ito atftor ft tto toytr 
^ w ^ ^ ^ « M f t t f f t k f t t f t A r f t l t W f t K f t . k l t a t a M f t J ) a a a ^ hat «atfft,ti taaaaaat ftuml k fti 
1 to
*,r^^^»*^>«*Wr«'trt»^trmtotitt*ttot^ tt* ftrytr arm itol tto cMrft ft* ate* ttia«*« tto* to tto ma.. 
*Nm INVMWftV BJf tow 
* £ * T * 4 * * * * ' " * & <•> *"* "* «ft ttttr ttlifttoftUtoaftt4«»jr«ft^iMttft»t 
• • t r ft to tto toytr tot attottvtat ft |to toatanct fttraaf tftj f j m r N t o i a ' l M i t M r K t M C t * 
totfttoto tto afttrttltl Ito aator Mrtatt-tr.tt Ito toytfi atftwtfer tto catf ttoraaf. a» wtoJi a ^ 
I to ito twft toTW fete*** M atf taymtti tot tortWNtor ar toft U ctttfff «rk atf af l i t Itnta « c—ftftt torttf « a * « « * « < •• to«te«tttci i w r ^ v N 
tr laaatiiati to ttatrttttt' to m afamtt tto toyar ar tot attttdy ft tto ttftor tot rtaittaftt ctatt ft totom atof tto fttftrty « - totftt tf tuwtt m ca*l^c*i** a> -
tto m t t **« mat mt toytr toft to an rtaaw tt carnal -rft Mrartt« 3 (a) tto*t ar ttof ttft najt"t< fft*vca< **••€< «to>a^t (wtottor aracvttf to tto ttto* a> t , 
Ito toytr) « catetftot: to ftt itaavtr arto ft tiftrtt** ttorttf tto »^to atoi to« tto naft at tot ar * tftdftt, ft ftxtort tto ttfMft mttaimattt tornmttf tost tto **«**«< 
tofttca ctorft ftttpaltf « traiftaf iftrtat taftttor «t t aty ataatft to • * < * tto toytr atof toft toctftt ttftjaftf ftjrattttr ft to ttiMftattty tot ato Myafte fwttof 
ft aty a** avttt. aator tr aty ttoWf tr tftor amtar af Ito to. tiay tato — t f t t t t ami mat if taaf fatpftly « * W «a«am1 «ctoft*c any t a t ^ t f » «ccfttat«t ttrrio 
tto to tto atrptM ttftor may attar aptt fto aratiem *tor« xm4 prttttty may to mi itmttt umt SftV may tato ttasmwi at *i attor trtntrty - ito tou«totot t>tc»*tfl 
tfttwaatoAaflatfttfrtjftiiaiiii.mmtrttartotfitttortrtttr^ toytr ft to totot tor aty ctofm to ttarm| wc* aremtftv «ca«tt* ay atftor Wcftrtam 
ttttwato«aftafftCtM*^inaXltorttooam%mat< to rttam a« ptymttd mato pntr tto»fta by tto toytr torttrntor 
to tto aattf af rtamanatot tf uaj aatttrty tto ttcajrat' party ttoi toat ttcb r<ftj ato ramtfttt « art pftjmM ato aanMttf by to- mttomtf ftt »<M it itta^ 
torn ftt pratiaft ft pat ftaatfttow tf taaj artptrty nanut l i iiptatai mttrrad « ratafcmf ami murnvftj ft* itaj prtpmiy fto batoact tf we* pttctttH ttot to apttot la 
*? mmmt * * * » " • • < • . « l torttot atoM to pmf tatr ft fto toytr tr « tftorwit nm-i by to. m tm if ftfttwney toytr ato« pay tto umt * t * mlarttt t«cttl at 
tltoiwit prtvfttf by ft» 
_ Tk jaljtllPjlat Jf IMMl i f l ftjir^ftj If t>f ^ - f ttoct af a t totto tr prtoftt uto ar attor mtamtot f t a t o t i ttoJLbt mat if a t l « fttraaf aj marfH aati««t 
»tpa^ ta [to btytr at4 any J U pVuTTa^TtoTt la l t ; (iglTan ? J t » ttrtuto m ttto< tnttt4«a tf tto prttor^ 
7. It • ft«tM% t t^n laa i - *4 t f r t f t i ttut (•) t tctff tmtrt MM yvtftirty btft«mtor rs •< 1 tyft MK«a% tputj ftt p^wtui, Umtty tr mmctftld 
pwpftw, PMtftfMtorttj after M y 1, 1175 mi a l y t d ft ttfttr ' i (1) • H t U t vtrriaty tr (2) lemct cftHrtd tnttrfti atto p| fjat 4*tt ft* ttw cmtfract 
tr «(tPJi M 49jt Ifttfttfitr, tJwrt t r t M i f t f t M w v r a t U i t f fttrct^ftUWMy, f tmm ftr • ptrtxtltr wjrpftx tr vwrii trttft l wytft l tJtt 4ntn*m 
t f tfttj pc«t>tft7 • • Imt f«<• Ittrttf: ( I ) t ic t f t wtoart tfat
 M « t r • ttpj tM fttwfadwrtr tf uU pYtftrty tfti . P I nek maitofactwtf. tu t t4 I t btrycr 
•r ft 1 trwr ttwtr tf tmi yYtttrty ttft* ftjtftfactojrtr't MftKtte wrrtttt mm trftitct «»rrtftty ft ftsfttd ttoHttf «MJ uaf wrranty n « t f lKt at tto 
tot* htrttf, t x r t art at t i p t a t u m t t M t • * ! at rttmttPliPJtta; ft^tottt tr t lpttfttttt Mvt I t t t P M M »/ ttfttr i t r t t f t d tf i t t j prtttrty t t k u 
tftttrut* t t r t t t tr itctrptratttj itartn ty rtftrttct ftirtftt; M t t i t r ' t • ^ • t t t t i twJtr my t i t r t t i •arrttty ftttft a t f t t t t t M H as attreutf ahtll 
cmttjttoi tt acetrtJatct vrtfe Mw ttrfaj tntrttf a«i rtfartlcti tf tftttktr atfttf t t u i k m traraftrref attj aaufttf tt t t t tktr a t i t r ' i nftoh ktr t t tdtr . 
•ftf (c) tictpf wtotrt tto ttHir it akw tto puttfactortr tf uaf artttrty. ktytr tail t t t antrt tiamtl tty MtHetifttt ktWtr as as*fr«« tf tkts ctMrKt 
aty cuift tr mifMM wluck ttot ktytr « t r k t t t acawsf tto aaaafactwrpr tr a tttttr ttfttr that tto u lk r tf uft* p^tttrty tMattct' ptjrttMt t t r t t t 
^ . A . . l > > "Of* ***"** •* • * mwmm m ptymtat afur 4 ar ftt tox amiatl may tott tocami tat ami ptyaftt tortttor aMN aat to tttfttJ to atar ar aftact tto toter $ 
z T S l T ! . ^ ^ ? ^ " ^ , *+* * * * * • » • » • ' • * « bi m f f taa—: atymaati tr tfCttfl fttrtm aar atoM ftt itNtr t aettpUtct tf aty mttatotttt tr ptfattt tfltr aty tftor 
T ^ V r ^mH * ****** • —** * "• •** •»**«|t 
tf tluui!l!!LLr ,""<" " * , M W * , ' * d ****** by I t * tf any atatt tftaN at It toe* ttatt to mttadtvt tt tto Mtaft af wd» p*tH*tm« Mttoul m»atojatm| tto *am*«*c *+,.i+«% 
tr R i i f t r 0 * * " 1 * * " *** " * > N '*""' *tm4tm% ******** ** 9tki m ** ' ***** • * t * t o y * a a p m § t o . a r m ! t o r ^ f t r a ^ l t o r a t t tntottmatom ****% Pviy ttacotetf 
U. ^ • im^lmttt it tat ptrf M U M 10 iayt afftr tft t t t tatt tto wftor may «*iattfaty r»*< • t>«tfrai am) may mato tmf caftoct a cto*t* ** tacttftHg tm i ia t f t t t t t i ft tto 
Mtoti raretntaft tatt a»pto4 It tto amttai tttorrat tor tto ptriftt tf taton al ttot affttrittt atfttftMl cnarptt at prtwtml by to* 
MOTief Of PtOPOSCO eftCMTOI ItmnUMCf. ON U f t Of i f TCI — If a ctoryt tor bad* * Ituratct M tto tfa tf tto toytr n mdrnlml it 4C to tto fact ft ttot tmftraa 
mctofinc ttoi ant yttal to ftmttd ft tto amount mnitnaltd w tto fact totatf tt tto mummm auratHe arntNtt af mattanct payabk by tto u«l -ntftr tmltt tacft tt*t«a« caniractt 
Z^T4^1 ttot at tto timt af tto bu/tf't taaft tM »tl"t><< tf t i t ttptft* bttorict tf ftt **t*m tntot tact tf tudi ttvtrat ctntraett tr tto aortf att tf tto afwtu«tf maumwrn 
amauai at wuiranct imtftr aadi thtraof wiwcfiavaf 11 tto totaar aactttt tto afama* mamnum afcrtfatt ammml af Mttiranct andtr tucb uvtral ctntractt. an • acctrfanct -•!« lr»t 
ttfmt and cont4«ont M lorti m tto policy tr ctrtifkatt of msutanca nawtt by tto t f t r tu* mtwitf 
(b) It tto iAftrTanca tocomtt attdivt tto ttrw ttofatf thai oommanet at tto Salt of ttoi cantrad and »•« (m abtanct tf Stfa«i« to mttaWntnt p*rto«tt) cw*tnw« w«t.l tto Salt 
tr. vtoc* tto wop** baltAct af tto oMgatien htrtvtStr n tr btcamtt p*4 « f t t vntni tto mtwfanct rt ttrnMiattS tartor m acarSanct «s> tto ttmt ami o»i*<m ut «t«ti» n T»t 
P^cy tr Mrtmcatt «»wtS by ftt atortuiS Mturtr 
(ti It tto *« i t anS at tto condrlm that (I) tto buytf ffcaN Km mewrrtS aittalmant otb|»l«fli wtStr ttvtral ctntradt metodMt ttoi ant ctntairMt| a cnarat tor mtwranct 
preajrad an tot Mt from tto umt mturtr tt « Stt<rialaS on tto tact toiaef (2) tto iff'U«<* Of tto «it»imtnt obfciJOont unStf wen ttvtral ctntractt tacttSt mt a»nouM fltt ( 
naiad art 9+ tact to<aof at tto maiimum a||rafalt amount tf mturanct paytblt by tto u«S mwrtf ()) tto mttjimant ebl<ul«i trntor tack af men ttvtral Ctntractt rt or htt tocomt 
payabaj to tto umt ultor tttrawmltr tr It tto umt au*|nat ttortof and (4) **<*( tto Mttimt tt tto bvytf tto ilorau4 ttftor tr at«|fttt at tto « u may to n not.nad * - r i ^ i 
ft tto tortfoMi ttad. ttot at audi tint at tto anr*tatt tf • mwen tf tto ctor|t ctntamad • tac* tf tto ttvtral ctntradt at n mctodtd m tto wHalmtntt ttort'tfort pa4 tntrt 
tndar atjualt tto ctorft at tto umt ra<t for u 4 maitrrmm t|f rttalt amount of migrant! tto baUnct than payabto tndtr ant of wen ttvtral ctntractt tha* to rrtuetd by th« »U'« tte 
tf » muck tf tto ctorft n n mctodtd m tto mrtaWnantt ttoraattar payabto wndar aacfi af aucb uvtral ctntractt at * t * at by tto at f '«»* s« * "*** at tto fmantt Ch»»|« «»«tt<« 
an tit faca af aacn af audi contract! at a appfcabto to to muck of tht dtaryt at n mctodtd m Ito mitaWnantt thtrutttr payabto tndtr tacn of wd» tmral contradt. and tto bv»e» 
tnan to cradStd * « paymtnt ttoraef 
It tto avtnt that tto bwytf ditt imlla mwranct n « torn to tto orevmttanett prtoidad • w b d ^ w i (!) and (J) " tto pitcadmi wbpan|ftph but pr«r ta tht t mt Iff IV 
cradd ttoram »rtv4«d ft to madt and ito ttotasaid maj.mum Hf "1*« tmtunt (X mwranct tmltf twCh ttvtral ctntractt it toll than Ito «tr*(*tt •* ,h« | m w M •* »i»'*"« **** 
vtuld othtf«nt ha»t totn appaad to tormanl of tto toytr 1 otk|*i«r, unttt tadi t* wd> tmral ctntractt tton tht lt|il rtprata«tilr«a(»J of tht bwytr than to anl.t^d lo a »rtal» 
tf ftt lartfatt tf tto amount af tto eharp tor %u& muiranct mctodtd m aach t< wch ttvtral ctntractt tt tto ttttnt thai weh au '« t ' u ticttdl Ito Ctor|t at tto umt fUt le« •« 
amount af •wratce ttjwal to utf mtumum »u* t ' ' r tmount of mwunct 
(d) T)»t mctouon of tto charyt tor Ito ilo/au<d mturtnet 11 (I) upon tht
 wnttrttandw| mat tht toytr harato • * » « . and ratoawt tto tator tr attttntt frtm. *« cla<mt ta any 
and al wch nyhtt tontftti tr advanta|ts it may aarwt undtr wch mwranct tictplm| tto r.fhl tntrtv«dtf la tht ippkal»on of any prtcttdt tf wd» mwran« « piy»»»*n« a« tto 
ttogatftn wtStf thu cantrad, and (?) an tto ctndSion ttot d tto ttltor a wnablt tor i«»y rtaun to prtcurt wch mwranca Irom tht alortutd mwrar tht tt«tr thai I t t h . t« «o«.i| tn» 
bwytr It that aflact, «rhtrauptn tha balanct ptytbfc toraundtr thai to radwetd by tto amount of Ito char|t mcludad at atortu*d at »t« at by « raoalt tf • much tf tto f .«anct C»»iftt 
Stmaad • tto tact of » n cantrad u a apekubto to tto amount of u«d cnar|t arto tto bwytr thai to cttd'ttd nrrtii paymtnt thtrtof 
^d\ 
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